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ABA Explains Prosecutor’s
Ethical Disclosure Duty
BY PETER A. JOY AND
KEVIN C. McMUNIGAL

T

he ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility recently issued an advisory ethics opinion
explaining that the ethical duty of the prosecutor under Model Rule 3.8(d) to disclose exculpatory evidence and information to the defendant
is separate from, and more expansive than, the
disclosure obligations under the Constitution. In
Formal Opinion 09-454, available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/09-454.pdf, the standing committee explained the ethical standard and addressed
the scope and timing of required disclosure as
well as whether a prosecutor may demand waiver
of the ethical disclosure duty as a condition to a
guilty plea agreement.
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor to
“make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and the tribunal
all unprivileged mitigating information known
to the prosecutor.” In thoroughly examining the
relationship between Rule 3.8(d) and the prosecutor’s constitutional obligation under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Brady line
of cases, the standing committee addressed an issue that the Ethics 2000 Commission sidestepped.
The ABA’s ethics opinion is likely to be treated by
all jurisdictions as highly persuasive authority on
the prosecutor’s ethical disclosure duty, especially
since almost every jurisdiction has adopted the
language of Model Rule 3.8(d). It brings clarity
to an area that has been confusing for prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts. In this column,
we look at the key features of the opinion and its
implications for discovery in criminal cases.

PETER A. JOY is a professor of law and director of the
Criminal Justice Clinic at Washington University School
of Law in St. Louis, Missouri; he can be reached at joy@
wulaw.wustl.edu. KEVIN C. McMUNIGAL is the Judge Ben
C. Green Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio; he can be
reached at kcm4@case.edu. Both authors are contributing
editors to Criminal Justice magazine.

Scope of Disclosure Obligation

The opinion states that the analyses of the U.S.
Supreme Court and lower courts in the Brady
line of cases focus solely on the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under the due process clause,
which is separate from the ethical obligation imposed by Rule 3.8(d). These constitutional law
cases “establish a constitutional minimum but do
not purport to preclude jurisdictions from adopting more demanding disclosure obligations by
statute, rule of procedure, or rule of professional
conduct.”
Turning to the history of Rule 3.8(d), the opinion notes that the drafters of the rule “made no
attempt to codify the evolving constitutional case
law” or incorporate a legal standard, but rather
established an independent ethical duty of disclosure that “is more demanding than the constitutional case law.” As support for this interpretation, the opinion contrasts Model Rule 3.8(d)
with ethics rules that incorporate a legal standard
by prohibiting acts that are unlawful or prohibited by law. For example, Model Rule 3.4(a) makes
it unethical for a lawyer to “unlawfully obstruct
another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other
material having potential evidentiary value.”
(Emphasis added.) Model Rule 3.4(b) makes it
unethical for a lawyer to “offer an inducement
to a witness that is prohibited by law.” (Emphasis
added.) Model Rule 3.8(d) does not incorporate
the constitutional standard. It creates a separate,
more expansive ethical disclosure duty.
The standing committee also stated that its interpretation of Rule 3.8(d) is consistent with the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution
Function, Standard 3-3.11(a), which requires the
prosecutor “to make timely disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of all
evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense charged, or which
would tend to reduce the punishment of the accused.” The Commentary accompanying Prosecution Function Standard 3-3.11 states that the
obligation under Standard 3-3.11(a) “is virtually
identical to that imposed by ABA model ethics
codes, [and] goes beyond the corollary duty imposed upon prosecutors by constitutional law.”
Because the Rule 3.8(d) disclosure requirement
is more demanding than constitutional case law,
the standing committee stated that the ethics rule
“requires prosecutors to steer clear of the consti-
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tutional line, erring on the side of caution.”
No Materiality Limitation. Formal Opinion
09-454 states that Rule 3.8(d) mandates that a
prosecutor inform the accused of all known information favorable to the defendant even if the
prosecutor does not believe that the information
would affect the outcome of the case at trial. The
prosecutor’s constitutional obligation, as defined by the Brady line of cases, extends only to
favorable evidence that is “material,” which the
committee described as evidence “likely to lead
to an acquittal.” According to the opinion, Rule
3.8(d) does not have such a materiality limitation, and while the ethical “obligation may overlap with a prosecutor’s other legal obligations” it
is more expansive.
In evaluating evidence and information, the
opinion cautions the prosecutor to consider all
“legally cognizable defenses” and not just those
raised by defense counsel. There is not a “de
minimis exception to the prosecutor’s disclosure
duty,” and thus the prosecutor must turn over information even if the prosecutor believes that it
“has only a minimal tendency to negate the defendant’s guilt, or that the favorable evidence is
highly unreliable.”
Information as Well as Evidence. The ethics
rule requires the prosecutor to disclose both evidence and information “which tends to exculpate
the accused when viewed independently and that
which tends to be exculpatory when viewed in
light of other evidence or information known to
the prosecutor.” Thus, the ethical duty is not limited to admissible evidence, as in the Brady line of
cases. Rather, Rule 3.8(d) also mandates disclosure of “information” that may be inadmissible
but which “may lead a defendant’s lawyer to admissible testimony or other evidence or assist him
in other ways, such as in plea negotiations.”

Timing

The opinion also addresses the timing of disclosure. Disclosure must be made early enough so
that defense counsel may use the evidence and
information effectively. Reasoning that defense
counsel can use favorable evidence and information most effectively the sooner it is received, Rule
3.8(d) requires disclosure of such evidence and information “as soon as reasonably practical” once
it is known to the prosecutor.
The opinion examines how and when defense
counsel may use favorable evidence and informa-

tion, such as conducting a defense investigation,
deciding whether to raise a defense, determining
trial strategy, and advising the defendant whether
to plead guilty. Thus, “[t]he obligation of timely
disclosure of favorable evidence and information
requires disclosure to be made sufficiently in advance of these and similar actions and decisions
that the defense can effectively use the evidence
and information.”
Focusing on how important defense counsel’s
evaluation of the strength of the prosecutor’s case
is to a defendant considering whether to plead
guilty, the opinion states that timely disclosure
under Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of evidence
and information “prior to a guilty plea proceeding, which may occur concurrently with the defendant’s arraignment.” The Supreme Court in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), appeared
to reach a contrary conclusion about the prosecutor’s Brady obligation prior to a guilty plea. If the
prosecutor believes that early disclosure or disclosure of evidence or information may compromise
an ongoing investigation or prosecution witness’s
safety, the opinion advises the prosecutor to seek
a protective order.

Waiver

The opinion also makes clear that a defendant
may not waive or consent to the prosecutor’s abrogation of the ethical disclosure duty, and “a
prosecutor may not solicit, accept or rely on the
defendant’s consent” as a mechanism to avoid
Rule 3.8(d). The opinion notes that a third party
may not absolve a lawyer of an ethical duty except in specifically authorized instances, such as
consent to certain conflicts of interest. Rule 3.8(d)
does not explicitly permit third-party consent or
waiver of the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation.
The opinion states that Rule 3.8(d) is designed
both to protect the defendant and “to promote
the public’s interest in fairness and reliability of
the justice system, which requires that defendants
be able to make informed decisions.” Allowing
the prosecutor to obtain a defendant’s waiver of
disclosure of favorable evidence and information
undermines defense counsel’s ability to advise the
defendant whether to plead guilty and may lead a
factually innocent defendant to plead guilty.
In reaching this conclusion, the standing committee observed that whether the defendant may
waive the constitutional right under Brady to receive exculpatory evidence appears unresolved
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after the decision in Ruiz. In Ruiz, the Court held
that a plea agreement could require the defendant
to forgo the right to receive material evidence that
could be used to impeach critical witnesses and
information regarding any affirmative defenses.
Nonetheless, the standing committee stated that
even if the courts were to hold that a defendant
could entirely waive the right to favorable evidence for constitutional purposes, “the ethical
obligations established by Rule 3.8(d) are not coextensive with the prosecutor’s constitutional duties of disclosure . . . .”
If the prosecutor seeks to withhold favorable
evidence or information for a legitimate purpose,
such as to prevent witness tampering, again the
opinion advises the prosecutor to seek a protective order to limit what must be disclosed. Another acceptable alternative in the committee’s view
would be to “seek an agreement with the defense
to return, and maintain the confidentiality of evidence and information it receives.”

Knowledge, Supervisory Responsibility,
and Sentencing

The opinion also addresses three other aspects
of the prosecutor’s ethical disclosure obligation: knowledge, the obligations of supervisors,
and the disclosure obligation in connection
with sentencing.
Knowledge. Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of
favorable evidence and information “known to
the prosecutor.” Model Rule 1.0(f) defines knowledge as “actual knowledge” that “may be inferred
from [the] circumstances.” In a prior advisory
ethics opinion, ABA Formal Opinion 95-396,
the standing committee stated that because actual knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances, “[i]t follows . . . that a lawyer may not
avoid [knowledge of a fact] simply by closing her
eyes to the obvious.” This view is consistent with
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution
Function, Standard 3-3.11(c), stating, “A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of
evidence because he or she believes it will damage
the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.” But,
Formal Opinion 09-454 states that “Rule 3.8(d)
does not establish a duty to undertake an investigation in search of exculpatory evidence.”
While the prosecutor may not pursue a path of
willful ignorance to avoid the ethical disclosure
obligation, the knowledge requirement limits the
ethical rule. For example, the opinion states that

a prosecutor is not required “to conduct searches
or investigations for favorable evidence that may
possibly exist but of which . . . [the prosecutor
is] unaware.” As an example, the opinion uses a
guilty plea made at the time of the arraignment.
At that point, the prosecutor must disclose all
known evidence and information that would be
relevant or useful in establishing possible defenses or negating the government’s proof. “If
the prosecutor has not yet reviewed voluminous
files or obtained all police files, however, Rule
3.8 does not require the prosecutor to review or
request such files unless the prosecutor actually
knows or infers from the circumstances, or it is
obvious, that the files contain favorable evidence
or information.”
Supervisory Responsibility. The ethics opinion
also provides guidance to lawyers with managerial responsibility in the prosecutor’s office. Those
supervisory lawyers are obligated to ensure that
subordinate lawyers comply with Rule 3.8(d). The
supervisory lawyer who directly oversees a trial
prosecutor must ensure that the trial prosecutor
meets his or her ethical disclosure obligation. A
supervisory lawyer is “subject to discipline for ordering, ratifying or knowingly failing to correct
discovery violations.” The opinion advises such
managerial lawyers to promote compliance with
Rule 3.8(d) by adequately training subordinate
lawyers and by having internal office procedures
that facilitate compliance.
As an example, the opinion discusses a case in
which work is distributed among several different
prosecutors. In such a situation, the opinion advises an internal policy requiring all prosecutors
on the case to convey all files containing favorable
evidence or information to the prosecutor responsible for discovery. Another useful internal policy
would require that favorable information conveyed orally to a prosecutor be memorialized in
writing. The opinion also recommends requiring
a prosecutor who obtains information favorable
to a defendant in another case to provide it to the
colleague responsible for that other case.
Disclosure for Sentencing. In connection to
sentencing, the opinion points out four ways in
which the duty to disclose to the defense and the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor differs from the disclosure obligation that applies before a guilty plea
or trial. First, the information differs because the
duty requires disclosure of mitigating information
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recidivism reduction. Research has validated that
belief. An evaluation conducted by Professor
Bruce Western of Harvard University concluded
that ComALERT graduates were substantially less
likely to be rearrested, reconvicted, or reincarcerated than parolees in a matched control group (available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/soc/faculty/
western/pdfs/report_1009071.pdf).
As reentry programs proliferate, research will
prove critical in identifying those aspects of reentry
programs that work best. The National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) apparently recognizes the importance of this issue. For example, the NIJ is currently funding a multiyear comprehensive evaluation of the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry
Initiative, a collaborative federal effort to improve
reentry outcomes along criminal justice, employment, education, health, and housing dimensions.
The study is being jointly conducted by the Urban
Institute and the Research Triangle Institute.
Understanding the mounting interest in such
reentry programs and in how to implement them
successfully, the Criminal Justice Section sponsored a Reentry Summit on November 5, in
Washington, D.C. Criminal justice practitioners
who run reentry programs in a variety of practice
settings around the country convened to discuss
all aspects of their programs, including creation,
expansion, trouble-shooting, and measures of
success. Those contemplating launching their own
reentry programs gained practical know-how,
and those with programs already up and running
profited greatly from the stimulating exchange of
ideas and information.
On November 6, the Section further explored
the myriad issues surrounding reentry at this
year’s Sentencing Advocacy, Practice and Reform
Institute. The well-attended conference had a
great cross-section of panelists offering their expertise and insights. Among the topics discussed
were the Second Chance Act, supervised release,
and collateral consequences of convictions.
This last topic is also now the focus of a new
grant secured by the Section. The NIJ awarded
the Section $700,000 over the next three years
to conduct a comprehensive all-states survey of
adult collateral consequences and create an easily accessible and searchable database of the collected information. This ambitious project is a
natural follow-up to the reference work produced
through a collaboration of the ABA and the Public Defender Services for the District of Colum-

bia, Internal Exile (ABA 2009), a compilation of
the collateral consequences arising under federal
statutes and regulations. Former chair of the Section as well as chair of the ABA Commission on
Effective Criminal Sanctions, Professor Stephen
Saltzburg of George Washington School of Law,
with his deep reserves of both expertise and stamina, will serve as chair of the advisory board for
the new project. Once up and running, the new
Web-based national inventory of collateral consequences (covering areas such as employment bars,
housing restrictions, curtailment of voting rights,
limits on education loans and scholarships, and
deportation, to name but a few) will inform the
public discourse on reentry and help guide policy
makers as they consider the appropriate role of
sanctions and disqualifiers.
Just as research is already helping us refine reentry programs and make them more effective,
research can also help policy makers in identifying those collateral consequences that make the
most (and the least) sense from a public safety
standpoint. One of the frequent and most serious stumbling blocks to an ex-prisoner’s successful reentry into the community is his or her
inability to secure employment. The reasons for
this are many, but among them is an employer’s
fear that the ex-prisoner will reoffend while on
the job. When developing policy on employment
restrictions and the availability of criminal history records, jurisdictions must balance the public
interest in, on the one hand, preserving the safety
of the workplace, including customers and other
employees, and, on the other hand, ensuring that
ex-offenders obtain jobs and become contributing
members of society. Recent research may provide
empirical evidence to inform that discussion.
Professor Alfred Blumstein, a preeminent
criminologist and a 2007 winner of the Stockholm Prize in Criminology, and Kiminori Nakamura, a doctoral student at the Heinz College of
Carnegie Mellon University, are conducting an
NIJ-funded study on the “redemption point”—
that point in time from the commission of the
crime when a person with a criminal record who
remained free of further contact with the criminal
justice system is of no greater risk to committing
a new crime than any counterpart of the same age.
The initial findings of their recidivism risk study
are presented in “Redemption in the Presence of
Widespread Criminal Background Checks,” in
Criminology 47(2) (May 2009). Their ongoing re-

Criminal Justice, Volume 24, Number 4, Winter 2010. © 2009 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved.
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or
retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association

CJWI10_web.indd 44

12/15/09 11:48:48 AM

search has clear implications for employers struggling to make hiring decisions on individuals with
criminal backgrounds.
As our nation over the last few decades expanded its use of incarceration as a way to address crime, we perhaps did not adequately foresee some of the social and fiscal consequences of

this prison-based strategy. Going forward, let’s
keep our eyes open. Research can help us craft
intelligent policies with regard to reentry. An estimated 95 percent of all inmates will eventually be
released from prison. Let’s do all we can to ensure
that they develop a stake in society, and don’t put
a stake through it. n
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